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THE TWOMBLY STANDARD AND AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES: WHAT IS GOOD FOR THE GOOSE IS
NOT ALWAYS GOOD FOR THE GANDER
Anthony Gambol*
The United States district courts disagree as to whether the plausibility
pleading standard for claims first described by the United States Supreme
Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly also extends to affirmative
defenses pled by defendants in federal courts. The divergent opinions result
from conflicting interpretations of the language of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, standards of preferred practice, and notions of fairness.
This Note examines the district courts’ arguments in deciding whether
the Twombly standard extends to affirmative defenses. It identifies the
quiddities of the courts’ reasoning through an analysis of their decisions
and, based upon this review, argues that the courts should not extend the
Twombly standard to affirmative defenses. This Note shows how this
conclusion adheres to the text and intention of the Federal Rules, as well as
the holding and public policy considerations of Twombly itself. Moreover,
it acknowledges that simple injustice would befall defendants on account of
an extension of the Twombly standard.
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INTRODUCTION
In early 2009, Michael and Diane Wszola were in a dispute with their
former neighbors, the Shinews, over the use of their shared lakefront
property. 1 The Shinews had moved and sued, seeking judgment that they
were entitled to rent out the land.2 The property had been a point of
contention before; both the Wszolas and the Shinews had been parties to a
state court litigation that had defined the property’s ownership rights and its
authorized users. 3

1. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Jury Demand at 8, Shinew v. Wszola,
Civil Action No. 08-14256, 2009 WL 1076279 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 6, 2008), 2008 U.S. Dist.
Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 8317, at *5–6.
2. See id. at 4–7.
3. See Motion for Summary Disposition at 4–6, Shinew v. Wszola, Civil Action No.
08-14256, 2009 WL 1076279 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2009), 2009 WL 3834473.
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Through inadvertence, the Wszolas forgot to add a few affirmative
defenses to their responsive pleading. 4 The time within which they could
amend their pleadings by right had passed, so they needed to move the
court for leave to do so. 5 They set forth a list of affirmative defenses that
they wished to rely upon, including a res judicata defense that may have
precluded the federal action, because the question had already been settled
in state court.6 The Shinews opposed the motion, arguing that the
affirmative defenses were insufficiently pled.7
The Wszolas could not have imagined that their motion would be denied.
Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 8 the relevant precedent in the district, had allowed a
succinctly pled affirmative defense to stand. While the Supreme Court had
increased the specificity with which claims had to be pled in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 9 just a few months earlier the district in which the
Wszolas were sued had concluded in First National Insurance Co. of
America v. Camps Services, Ltd. 10 that Twombly did not extend to
affirmative defenses.
The First National court acknowledged that Twombly “raised the
requirements for a well-pled complaint” under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a), but distinguished the language of Rule 8(c), the “applicable
rule for affirmative defenses.” 11 As such, the court found that Twombly’s
analysis of the Rule 8(a) requirements was inapplicable to Rule 8(c).12 The
court accordingly applied the pleading standard for affirmative defenses
articulated in Davis and allowed the defendant’s succinct affirmative
defense to stand. 13
It must have then come as a surprise to the Wszolas when the district
court in its opinion criticized the Wszolas’ proposed affirmative defenses as
a “grocery list.” 14 The court conceded that “the assertion of affirmative
defenses in that manner is not uncommon” and had been “widely employed

4. See Motion To Amend Pleadings at 2, Shinew v. Wszola, Civil Action No. 0814256, 2009 WL 1076279 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2009), 2009 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS
5756, at *1.
5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (explaining that parties in federal court have twenty-one
days to make amendments to their pleadings as of right, after which time a party may amend
its pleading only with the opposing party’s consent or leave of the court).
6. See Motion To Amend Pleadings, supra note 4, at 4 (“Plaintiffs claims are barred by
waiver, laches, estoppel, res judicata, collateral estoppel, the applicable statute of limitations,
and the statute of repose.”).
7. See Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion To Amend Pleadings at 7–
9, Shinew v. Wszola, Civil Action No. 08-14256, 2009 WL 1076279 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21,
2009), 2009 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 5757, at *10–13.
8. 148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998).
9. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
10. No. 08-cv-12805, 2009 WL 22861 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009).
11. See id. at *2.
12. See id.
13. See id. (“The affirmative defenses laid out by Camps in this case are similar to those
in Davis, and provide adequate notice to First National.”).
14. See Shinew v. Wszola, No. 08-14256, 2009 WL 1076279, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21,
2009).
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(and tolerated) as a form of ‘notice pleading.’”15 However, the court
believed that the dissent in Davis presaged the application of the pleading
standard for claims described in Twombly to defensive pleadings.16
Moreover, the court believed that the problem of discovery costs
contemplated by Twombly was applicable to both claims and defenses.17
Accordingly, the court held that the Twombly standard extended to
affirmative defenses. 18 Thereupon, the court found that the Wszolas’
proposed affirmative defenses were insufficiently pled 19 and denied them
leave to amend. 20
As the Wszolas’ problem suggests, the district courts are divided as to
whether the plausibility pleading standard for claims originally described in
Twombly and clarified in Ashcroft v. Iqbal 21 also extends to defendants’
affirmative defenses. The issue usually arises in the context of Rule 12(f)
motions to strike an affirmative defense.22 The tension between an
extension of the Twombly standard and the language of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (Rules) has resulted in some creative jurisprudence.23 A
bounty of “well-reasoned case law” exists on both sides, with the decisions
turning upon the structure of the Federal Rules as well as “relevant policy
considerations and principles of fairness.” 24 No circuit court has yet ruled
on the issue. 25

15. See id. at *2 (downplaying as “clearly dicta” precedent which holds that Rule 8(b)
does not apply when a defendant asserts an affirmative defense).
16. See id. at *3–4.
17. See id. at *4.
18. See id. (“[T]he Supreme Court has established a general standard of pleading matters
upon which the pleader assumes the burden of proof.”).
19. See id. at *4 (“The proposed amended pleading offered by Defendants in this case is
the very essence of the boilerplate ‘labels and conclusions’ which the court in Twombly
found insufficient.”).
20. See id. at *5–6 (“Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) provides that a court should freely grant
leave to amend a pleading ‘when justice so requires.’ The party requesting the amendment
bears the burden of establishing that the standard is met.”).
21. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
22. See, e.g., First Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Camps Servs., Ltd., No. 08-cv-12805, 2009
WL 22861, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009). The other common context in which the issue
arises is a contested Rule 15(a) motion to amend the pleadings where an affirmative defense
is offered for inclusion. See, e.g., Shinew, 2009 WL 1076279, at *1.
23. See, e.g., Kaufmann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Civil Action No. 09-10239-RGS,
2009 WL 2449872, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 6, 2009) (attempting to reconcile its disposition to
extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses with both common practice and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) by developing a hybrid standard under which only
those affirmative defenses that are not listed under Rule 8(c)(1) must have factual support
because those affirmative defenses which are listed under Rule 8(c)(1) are so commonly
used and spartanly pled that they inherently provide sufficient notice to satisfy the Twombly
standard simply by being stated).
24. See Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., Civil Action No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL
2605179, at *4 (W.D. Va. June 24, 2010).
25. See Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:09cv737, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77083, at *16 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010) (“[N]either the Fourth Circuit nor any other
court of appeals has ruled on the question presented: whether Twombly and Iqbal extended
the federal pleading requirements to a defendant’s affirmative defenses.”).
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A defendant does not select to be haled into court; a policy that limits
recourse to a full and vigorous defense deserves careful scrutiny. This Note
explores district courts’ arguments in determining whether the Twombly
standard extends to affirmative defenses. Based on those considerations,
this Note argues that courts should not extend the Twombly standard to
affirmative defenses. In Part I, this Note explores the procedural rules and
pleading standards for claims and affirmative defenses in federal courts,
including the modification of the pleading standard for claims articulated in
Twombly and Iqbal. In Part II, this Note examines the conflicting
arguments relied upon by the district courts in deciding that the Twombly
standard does or does not extend to affirmative defenses. Finally, in Part
III, this Note argues on grounds of procedure, precedent, and policy that
courts should not extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses.
I. PROCEDURE AND POLICY: PLEADINGS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Part I of this Note explores the federal procedural rules and pleading
standard. Part I.A introduces the Federal Rules and gives a brief account of
their purpose in federal courts, as well as the process through which they
may be amended. Part I.B traces the evolution of the pleading standard for
claims in federal courts from the promulgation of the Rules to the present
day, including the Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in Twombly and
Iqbal, and discusses the rationale and impact of the modern pleading
standard. Then, Part I.C discusses the pleading of affirmative defenses by
defendants before Twombly and outlines the standard by which the
sufficiency of an affirmative defense was determined in a motion under
Rule 12(f)—when a plaintiff moves to strike an affirmative defense from
the pleadings.
A. The Federal Rules
The Federal Rules govern procedure in all civil actions and proceedings
in the United States district courts. 26 With the passage of the Rules
Enabling Act (Act), Congress vested the Supreme Court with the authority
to prescribe the Rules and described processes through which such
prescriptions would be enacted. 27 Congress passed the current Act “to
modernize the current statutory provisions relating to the Federal judiciary’s
role in promulgating amendments to . . . various rules of procedure
applicable to the Federal courts.” 28

26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
27. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74 (2006) (“The Supreme Court shall
have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for
cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges
thereof) and courts of appeals.”); see also Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role
in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1045–46
(1993).
28. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, pt. 3, at 26 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5982, 5986.
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Congress believed that the Court had overstepped the bounds of its
rulemaking authority in the years immediately preceding the passage of the
current Act and, accordingly, limited the scope of the Court’s rulemaking
authority to those areas within its particular area of competence.29
Specifically, Congress ensured that the Rules promulgated by the Court
would be strictly procedural in nature.30 Because the Federal Rules are
ultimately statutory, changes can only be accomplished “by the process of
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”31 Even so,
the Federal Rules are frequently updated and amended, including a
substantial revision in 2007 for the purposes of “clarifying and simplifying
the rules, making them easier to use and understand, without changing
substantive meaning.” 32
B. The Federal Pleading Standard for Claims: From Conley to Twombly
and Iqbal
When they were first adopted, the Rules were meant to institute a
procedural form that was more accessible than the earlier forms of pleading

29. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 22 (1985) (“So viewed, proposed section 2072 leaves
to the Supreme Court primary responsibility for prospective federal regulation of matters
peculiarly within the competence of judges. It reserves to Congress decisions concerning
prospective federal regulation of matters peculiarly within its competence, having regard to
Congress’ representative nature and to its experience in prospective lawmaking that
variously affects its constituencies in their out-of-court affairs. Further refinement of the
scope of delegation will undoubtedly prove necessary. The Committee believes, however,
that such refinement should come in the first instance from those responsible for proposing
rules. Conscientious attention to the purposes of, and limitations on, the delegation should
prevent controversy of the sort that has plagued federal supervisory court rulemaking in
recent years.”).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (“[The Federal Rules] shall not abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 21–22 (“[T]he bill does not confer
power on the Supreme Court to promulgate rules regarding matters, such as limitations and
preclusion, that necessarily and obviously define or limit rights under the substantive law.
The protection extends beyond rules of substantive law, narrowly defined, however. At the
least, it also prevents the application of rules, otherwise valid, where such rules would have
the effect of altering existing remedial rights . . . . [It] is intended to allocate to Congress, as
opposed to the Supreme Court exercising delegated legislative power, lawmaking choices
that necessarily and obviously require consideration of policies extrinsic to the business of
the courts . . . .”).
31. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (citing Leatherman v.
Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coord. Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)); see also Pavelic &
LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) (“We give the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure their plain meaning . . . .”). But see Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1,
94 (2010) (“The Supreme Court’s bypass of the rulemaking process in Twombly raises the
question: what is the purpose of today’s elaborate statutory process, given the Court’s
willingness to revise important aspects of the Rules on its own rather than follow its existing
precedents?”).
32. See ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, COMM. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 19 (2006),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/
CV06-2006.pdf.
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that preceded it. 33 In particular, Rule 8 “embodie[d] this major shift in
approach.” 34 Rule 8 describes the requirements for pleadings in federal
courts. 35 The pleadings in a lawsuit set forth the parties’ contentions in the
33. See Hon. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 458 (1943) (“Strict
pleading produces a reaction, because people will not tolerate the denial of justice for
formalities only. That, as we should do well to recall, was the history of common-law
pleading, as well as of some of the later misapplications of code pleading.”); see also LINDA
J. SILBERMAN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 540 (3d ed. 2009) (“The
modern pleader is at much lesser risk of losing his rights through a technical pleading
mistake.”).
34. See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern
World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1118 (2010).
35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (“Rule 8: General Rules of Pleading
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court
already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different
types of relief.
(b) Defenses; Admissions and Denials.
(1) In General. In responding to a pleading, a party must:
(A) state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it; and
(B) admit or deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party.
(2) Denials—Responding to the Substance. A denial must fairly respond to the substance of
the allegation.
(3) General and Specific Denials. A party that intends in good faith to deny all the
allegations of a pleading—including the jurisdictional grounds—may do so by a general
denial. A party that does not intend to deny all the allegations must either specifically deny
designated allegations or generally deny all except those specifically admitted.
(4) Denying Part of an Allegation. A party that intends in good faith to deny only part of an
allegation must admit the part that is true and deny the rest.
(5) Lacking Knowledge or Information. A party that lacks knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an allegation must so state, and the statement has
the effect of a denial.
(6) Effect of Failing to Deny. An allegation—other than one relating to the amount of
damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied. If
a responsive pleading is not required, an allegation is considered denied or avoided.
(c) Affirmative Defenses.
(1) In General. In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance
or affirmative defense, including: accord and satisfaction; arbitration and award; assumption
of risk; contributory negligence; discharge in bankruptcy; duress; estoppel; failure of
consideration; fraud; illegality; injury by fellow servant; laches; license; payment; release;
res judicata; statute of frauds; statute of limitations; and waiver.
(2) Mistaken Designation. If a party mistakenly designates a defense as a counterclaim, or a
counterclaim as a defense, the court must, if justice requires, treat the pleading as though it
were correctly designated, and may impose terms for doing so.
(d) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; Alternative Statements; Inconsistency.
(1) In General. Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is
required.
(2) Alternative Statements of a Claim or Defense. A party may set out 2 or more statements
of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count or defense or in
separate ones. If a party makes alternative statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of
them is sufficient.
(3) Inconsistent Claims or Defenses. A party may state as many separate claims or defenses
as it has, regardless of consistency.
(e) Construing Pleadings.
Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”).
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suit; they are usually composed of the plaintiff’s complaint (containing
claims) and the defendant’s answer to the complaint (containing denials,
admissions, and defenses). 36 Generally, plaintiffs must prove their claims
and defendants must prove their defenses. 37
The legal sufficiency of a claim is challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.38
This motion posits that even if the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s
complaint are true, the law does not grant the plaintiff a right to relief.39
Even with Rule 12(b)(6) in place, the Supreme Court did not define the
standard of pleading necessary to display the legal sufficiency of a claim for
nearly twenty years after the first Rules were promulgated.
This section introduces the pleading standard for claims in the federal
courts. First, it describes the long-standing Conley decision and the
pleading standard that Conley implemented. Then, it explores Twombly’s
abrogation of the Conley standard and the adoption of the plausibility
pleading standard for claims, which is clarified in Iqbal.
1. The Conley Standard
In 1957, the standard for pleading a complaint in the federal courts was
described in Conley v. Gibson. 40 The action in Conley was brought as a
class suit under the Railway Labor Act. 41 The plaintiffs, African American
railway workers, alleged that their union did not represent them equally and
in good faith compared to their white counterparts. 42 The lower courts had
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court rejected
that conclusion and ruled that the action could proceed.43 Because the
lower courts had not considered the other arguments offered on account of
the jurisdictional dismissal, the Court addressed those arguments before
remand. 44 Among others, the union defendants argued that the plaintiffs
had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted and that the
complaint failed to set forth specific facts to support its general allegations
of discrimination. 45
The Court appraised the sufficiency of the complaint by following “the
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 46 To this
end, the Court found that the “decisive answer” was in the Federal Rules,
which do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See SILBERMAN ET AL., supra note 33, at 535.
See id. at 556–57.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
See SILBERMAN ET AL., supra note 33, at 595–96.
355 U.S. 41 (1957).
See 45 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
See Conley, 355 U.S. at 42–43.
See id. at 43–45.
See id. at 45–48.
See id. at 45, 47.
Id. at 45–46.
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bases his claim. 47 Rather, a complaint needed only to contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what
the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”48 The Federal
Rules suggested this “notice pleading” in their discovery and other pretrial
procedures to “disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense
and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.”49 Accordingly,
the Court found that plaintiffs in Conley had adequately set forth a claim
and gave the respondents fair notice of its basis.50 In holding that the
plaintiffs had adequately stated a claim, the Conley Court maintained that
the Federal Rules “reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in
which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept
the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on
the merits.” 51
“Conley quickly became the dominant case interpreting modern pleading
doctrine.” 52 A plaintiff satisfied Conley if it provided a defendant with fair
notice of the claim. 53 For fifty years, the Supreme Court defended the
language of the Federal Rules and the practice of “notice” pleading
described by Conley’s “no set of facts” language from encroaching
requirements of greater particularity in pleading claims, despite some
criticism. 54 That changed with the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in
Twombly. 55
2. The Twombly Standard
Twombly replaced Conley’s notice pleading standard with the more
demanding “plausibility” pleading standard for claims. 56 As will be
explored later in this Note, district courts deciding whether to extend the

47. See id. at 47.
48. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Id. at 47–48 & n.9 (pointing to Rule 12(e) (motion for a more definite statement),
Rule 12(f) (motion to strike a portion of a pleading), Rule 12(c) (motion for judgment on the
pleadings), Rule 16 (pre-trial procedure), Rules 26–37 (rules for depositions and discovery),
Rule 56 (motion for summary judgment), and Rule 15 (right to amend) as Rules that allow
for inquiry into the basis of pleadings and to narrow the dispute).
50. See id. at 48.
51. Id.
52. Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 111 (2009).
53. See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1300–02
(2010).
54. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coord. Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168 (1993) (“We think that it is impossible to square the ‘heightened pleading standard’
applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by
the Federal Rules.”). But see Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th
Cir. 1989) (noting the tension between Conley’s “no set of facts” language and its averment
that a plaintiff must display the “grounds” upon which its claim rests).
55. See, e.g., Gaines v. Lawrence, No. 07-3212-SAC, 2010 WL 3829467, at *3 n.7
(D. Kan. Sept. 22, 2010) (“‘[T]he accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief,’ as stated in Conley v. Gibson,
was abrogated in Twombly.” (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46)).
56. See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 34, at 1108–09.
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Twombly standard to affirmative defenses rely heavily upon the language
and meaning of Twombly and its sister case, Iqbal. 57 Accordingly, these
cases will be discussed in detail.
a. Plausibility Conceived: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
The controversy in Twombly 58 entailed a putative class action59 brought
on behalf of local telephone and high speed Internet users over a seven-year
period. 60 The complaint alleged conspiracy in restraint of trade under the
Sherman Act 61 on the part of incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs),
the regional phone and internet service monopolies. 62 The complaint
theorized that the ILECs illegally agreed to hinder smaller carriers’ access
to their markets and maintain artificially high prices for consumers by not
competing with one another. 63
The Court, through Justice David H. Souter, noted that conscious
parallelism 64 is not, in itself, unlawful and that such actions may be
“consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of
rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by
common perceptions of the market.” 65 Accordingly, the Court stated that
the plaintiff must display evidence that tended to “exclude the possibility of
independent action” by the ILECs. 66
The Court concluded that the antecedent question was what a plaintiff
needed to plead to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 67 Citing
Conley, the Court interpreted Rule 8(a)(2) as requiring only “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in
order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” 68 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, a claim did not need detailed factual allegations, but “a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.”69 The facts pled must be sufficient “to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that

57. See infra Part II.
58. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
59. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (allowing members of a group (class) to sue or be sued on
behalf of all members).
60. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
62. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550.
63. See id. at 550–51.
64. See id. at 553–54 (describing “conscious parallelism” as a knowingly shared, but not
explicitly agreed to, course of action maintained because it is in each party’s best economic
interest).
65. Id. at 554.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 554–55.
68. Id. at 555 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) and Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id. (alteration in original).
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all the allegations in the complaint are true.” 70 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court reasoned that “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a ‘showing’ . . . of
entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is
hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not
only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the
claim rests.” 71
Applying these “general standards” to the pleading at hand, the Court
explained that “[a]sking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does
not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls
for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of illegal agreement.”72 Further, the Court expounded that this
requirement at the pleading stage for “allegations plausibly suggesting” an
agreement between the ILECs “reflects the threshold requirement of Rule
8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” 73 The Court found that allegations detailing
parallel conduct got “close to stating a claim, but without some further
factual enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of ‘entitle[ment] to relief.’”74
For the sake of time and money of both the parties and the courts, the
Court instructed that a deficient complaint should be excised at the earliest
convenience. 75 While acknowledging a sense of caution inherent in
dismissing a claim before discovery has occurred, the Court highlighted the
expense involved in an antitrust discovery process: “‘a district court must
retain the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing
a potentially massive factual controversy to proceed.’” 76 The Court did not
believe that judicial supervision and case management, however careful,
could successfully defend against abusive discovery practices or groundless
claims that fall just shy of plausible entitlement to relief.77 “Probably, then,
it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting
conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of
discovery in cases with no reasonably founded hope that the [discovery]
process will reveal relevant evidence.” 78
The plaintiffs in Twombly argued that Conley’s standard for evaluating
motions to dismiss precluded the application of the “plausibility standard”
at the pleading stage. 79 The Court admitted that the “no set of facts”
language, when read in isolation—a “focused and literal reading”—would
70. Id. at 555–56 (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 555 n.3.
72. Id. at 556.
73. Id. at 557 (alteration in original).
74. Id. (alteration in original).
75. See id. at 558.
76. Id. (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528
n.17 (1983)).
77. See id. at 559 (lamenting that the threat of discovery expenses will compel
defendants to settle even unmeritorious cases).
78. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dura Pharm.,
Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
79. See id. at 560–61.
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allow a “wholly conclusory” claim to survive a motion to dismiss when the
pleading left open the possibility of later establishing some set of
undisclosed facts to support recovery. 80 Describing how the Conley “no set
of facts” language had been generally misinterpreted, the Court decided that
that “famous observation has earned its retirement.” 81
The Supreme Court then, applying its interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) and
Conley, found that the plaintiffs’ complaint came up short. 82 “We think
that nothing contained in the complaint invests either the action or inaction
alleged with a plausible suggestion of conspiracy,” due to “obvious
alternative explanation[s].” 83 The Court clarified that it did not require
heightened factual specificity, but only enough facts “to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face. Because the plaintiffs here have not
nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their
complaint must be dismissed.” 84
Justice John Paul Stevens argued in dissent that judicial opinion
regarding the plausibility of a claim was an insufficient justification for
dismissal. 85 Justice Stevens agreed with the Court that parallel conduct on
the part of the ILECs was consistent with the absence of an agreement
between them, but also noted that that conduct was consistent with the
presence of an illegal agreement. 86 Justice Stevens attributed the Court’s
decision to practical concerns: private antitrust litigation can be very
expensive and jurors might mistakenly infer agreement from evidence of
parallel conduct. 87 Justice Stevens insisted, however, that the remedy for
those problems was “careful case management, including strict control of
discovery, careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage, and
lucid instructions to juries,” not dismissal or an interpretation of Rule
12(b)(6) that “seems to be driven by the majority’s appraisal of the
plausibility of the ultimate factual allegation rather than its legal
sufficiency.” 88 Criticizing the majority’s decision as being in tension with
both Rule 8 and Rule 9,89 Justice Stevens noted that the majority opinion
80. See id. at 561.
81. Id. at 563 & n.8 (“The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an
accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint. . . . Conley, then,
described the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not the
minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s survival.”).
82. See id. at 564.
83. Id. at 566–67 (finding that the economic incentives of individual incumbent local
exchange carriers (ILECs) are sufficient to explain their conduct and, accordingly, there is
no reason to infer that the ILECs agreed among themselves to do what was already in their
own best interest).
84. Id. at 570. The Court squared its holding with Rule 9, which delineates specific
instances in which pleadings must be pled with specificity. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9; Twombly,
550 U.S. at 569 & n.14.
85. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 571 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 572–73.
87. See id. at 573.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 573–76 & n.3; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 9 (requiring that some allegations,
not including states of mind, be pled with specificity); supra note 35.
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was the first by the Court to express “any doubt as to the adequacy” of the
Conley standard. 90 Moreover, Justice Stevens implied that the majority’s
creation of the new standard might exceed the Court’s authority under the
Rules Enabling Act. 91
Justice Stevens argued that the pleading standard codified in the Federal
Rules “does not require, or even invite, the pleading of facts,” and that,
despite the majority’s reinterpretation, the Conley standard reflected what a
complaint must contain, not what it may contain.92 Justice Stevens
criticized the majority’s new standard as inappropriate at the pleadings
stage, especially in antitrust cases where pre-pleading discovery is difficult
and Congress encourages private litigation.93 Justice Stevens further
contended that even if the claim, due to its lack of specificity, does not give
the notice that Rule 8 requires, the appropriate remedy “for an allegation
lacking sufficient specificity to provide adequate notice is, of course, a Rule
12(e) motion for a more definite statement.” 94 As to the majority’s policy
concern about the burdens of discovery and litigation, Justice Stevens
emphasized the district court’s case management arsenal, with which it may
control the proceedings before it.95
Justice Stevens acknowledged the potential for a dramatic shift in the
pleading standard for claims. 96 Whereas Conley had asked only that a
plaintiff be able to display some set of facts to support its recovery,97
Twombly seemed to require a plaintiff to show sufficient facts to convince a
court that its claim was plausible. 98 For a while, however, the reach of the
Court’s decision in Twombly was unclear due to its grounding in antitrust
law. 99 Further, the Court’s continued reliance upon the “notice pleading”
90. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 577–78 & n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing the sixteen
Supreme Court decisions in which the Court had cited to Conley’s “no set of facts”
language).
91. See id. at 579.
92. See id. at 580, 588 n.8 (“Here, the failure the majority identifies is not a failure of
notice—which ‘notice pleading’ rightly condemns—but rather a failure to satisfy the Court
that the agreement alleged might plausibly have occurred. That being a question not of
notice but of proof, it should not be answered without first hearing from the defendants (as
apart from their lawyers).”).
93. See id. at 585–87.
94. Id. at 590 n.9.
95. See id. at 593 n.13 (citing Rule 12(e) motions for a more definite statement, Rule
(7)(a) court-ordered plaintiff’s replies to answers, Rule 23 class certification motions’
“rigorous analysis” by courts, Rule 16’s court sanctioning powers and pretrial proceedings
control, including “elimination of frivolous claims or defenses” and “the control and
scheduling of discovery,” Rule 26’s court control over discovery, especially Rule 26(c)’s
specific permission for a court to protect a party from “annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense” caused by discovery, and the sanctions allowed by
Rule 11 for improper or frivolous claims and arguments).
96. See id. at 596 (“Whether the Court’s actions will benefit only defendants in antitrust
treble-damages cases, or whether its test for the sufficiency of a complaint will inure to the
benefit of all civil defendants, is a question that the future will answer.”).
97. See supra text accompanying note 46.
98. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e believe the
Court is not requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead
requiring a flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with
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standard described in Conley implied that it had not fully abandoned that
precedent. 100 However, the intended scope of Twombly became clearer in
2009 with Iqbal, 101 which clarified the plausibility pleading standard and
extended it to all claims pled in federal court.
b. Plausibility Defined: Ashcroft v. Iqbal
The controversy in Iqbal concerned the dismissal of respondent plaintiff
Javaid Iqbal’s complaint against defendant petitioners former Attorney
General John Ashcroft and Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Robert
Mueller. 102 Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim, was detained on immigration
charges following the September 11th attacks and was deemed to be of high
interest to the investigation into that incident. 103 Accordingly, he was
moved into restrictive conditions in a maximum security unit, where he was
allegedly subjected to serious mistreatment.104 Iqbal pled guilty to his
immigration charges and was deported to Pakistan. 105 Iqbal brought Bivens
actions 106 for violations of his First and Fifth Amendment rights against
more than fifty federal officials at all levels of government. 107 At issue in
the instant case, however, were only those claims against Ashcroft and

some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the
claim plausible.”), rev’d, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Temple v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., Nos. 06 CV 5303(JG), 06 CV 5304(JG), 2007 WL 2790154, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 25, 2007) (noting the confusion resultant from the Twombly decision and suggesting
that the plausibility pleading standard applies only in the context of antitrust litigation); J.
Douglas Richards, Three Limitations of Twombly: Antitrust Conspiracy Inferences in a
Context of Historical Monopoly, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 849, 851–52 (2008) (“All of the
references in Twombly to a ‘plausibility’ requirement are couched in relation to allegations
of antitrust conspiracy, and not to the pleading of claims generally. . . . [T]he opinion
expresses the requirement of ‘plausibility’ only in the course of ‘applying these general
standards to a § 1 [of The Sherman Act] claim’ . . . .”).
100. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (“Specific facts are not necessary;
the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555)); see also Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Twombly and Iqbal:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of Gregory
G. Garre, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP, former Solicitor General of the United States,
United States Department of Justice), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-0209%20Garre%20Testimony.pdf (“[I]t is worth emphasizing that the Court did not overrule
the Conley decision in Twombly. It simply clarified that a particular phrase in Conley—the
‘no set of facts’ language—was ‘an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading
standard.’ In doing so, the Court in Twombly observed that the civil rights complaint in
Conley ‘amply’ stated a claim under the proper pleading standard, making the ‘no set of
facts’ language an unnecessary part of the Court’s decision.”).
101. 129 S. Ct. 1937.
102. See id. at 1942.
103. See id. at 1942–43.
104. See id. at 1943–44.
105. See id. at 1943.
106. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 397 (1971) (finding an implied cause of action allowing for recovery of monetary
damages from federal agents who violate a claimant’s constitutional rights).
107. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943–44; see also U.S. CONST. amends. I, V.
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Mueller. 108 The claim alleged that petitioners “‘each knew of, condoned,
and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject’ respondent to harsh
conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his]
religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological
interest.’” 109
At trial, Ashcroft and Mueller moved to dismiss the claims against them
with defenses of qualified immunity 110 and lack of personal involvement,
but were rejected by the court, which applied Conley’s “no set of facts”
standard. 111 Invoking the collateral-order doctrine, which allows for
appeals of final determinations related to claims of right separable from an
underlying cause of action, they appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.112 While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
Thereupon, the Second Circuit applied its
decided Twombly. 113
interpretation of the Twombly standard to the petitioners’ appeal and
affirmed the district court’s rejection of their argument.114 Ashcroft and
Mueller appealed this decision.
Justice Kennedy wrote for a five-Justice majority. 115 The Court first
established that, to overcome qualified immunity, Iqbal must have pled
petitioners’ individual unconstitutional actions because government
officials may not be held liable for a subordinate’s act.116 Further, the
pleading must have displayed discriminatory purpose—that a course of
action was taken because of, and not merely in spite of, adverse effects
upon an identifiable group. 117 Accordingly, the Court examined the
complaint to see if it had been sufficiently pled.
The Court reaffirmed its holding in Twombly that, under Rule 8(a)(2), a
pleading does not require detailed factual allegations, but demands more
than an unadorned accusation. 118 A complaint must contain enough factual
matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 119 A claim is
facially plausible when the plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to allow the
court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

108. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
109. Id. (alteration in original).
110. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“[Qualified immunity means]
that government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”).
111. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
112. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 152 (2007).
113. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
114. See id.; see also Hasty, 490 F.3d at 157–58, 166, 174–76.
115. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942–54.
116. See id. at 1948.
117. See id. (citing Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
118. See id. at 1949 (“A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” (alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,
557)).
119. See id.
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misconduct alleged.” 120 The Court maintained that this was not a
probability requirement; however, it does require enough factual support to
suggest “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” 121
The Court described two “working principles” that underlay Twombly.122
First, when deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must suppose as true all of
the factual allegations of the complaint, but not the legal conclusions.123
Rule 8 did not “unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions.” 124 Second, only a complaint that
contained a plausible claim for relief can survive a motion to dismiss. 125
The plausibility of a claim for relief is a “context-specific” determination
which requires the deciding court to rely upon “judicial experience and
common sense.” 126 Where the factual content of a complaint does not
allow for the court to infer more than the “mere possibility of misconduct,”
the complaint has not shown that the pleader is entitled to relief.127 These
principles translate into a two-step process of review for Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss. First, a court must identify those claims which are not
entitled to the assumption of truth because they are unsupported by factual
allegations and are “no more than conclusions.” 128 A court must then
assume the truth of the remaining allegations and decide whether they
plausibly gave rise to an entitlement to relief. 129
Applying this process, the Court found that Iqbal’s pleading was
insufficient. First, most of the allegations were not entitled to the
assumption of truth. 130 Next, the well-pled factual allegations did not give
rise to a plausible inference that Iqbal was entitled to relief.131 The
allegations were consistent with a discriminatory course of action by the
petitioners, but because “more likely explanations” existed, they did not
“plausibly establish this purpose.” 132 Accordingly, the complaint was not
pled with the requisite specificity. 133
120. Id.
121. Id. (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s
liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)).
122. See id.
123. See id. at 1949–50 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).
124. Id. at 1950.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 1950–51 (“It is the conclusory nature of respondent’s allegations, rather
than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.”).
131. See id. at 1951–52 (finding that Iqbal’s complaint did not show that petitioners
purposefully housed detainees in the maximum security unit on account of race, religion, or
national origin, but rather that they sought “to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure
conditions available” until they were cleared).
132. Id. at 1951 (explaining that the September 11 attacks were perpetrated by Arab
Muslims and that a “legitimate policy” of law enforcement relating to individuals with
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Iqbal contended that the Twombly standard only applied in antitrust
cases. 134 The Court, however, found that reading inconsistent with both
Twombly and the Federal Rules:
“[Twombly] was based on our
interpretation and application of Rule 8. That Rule in turn governs the
pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States
district courts.’ Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard
for ‘all civil actions.’” 135 Iqbal further contended that the Court’s reading
of Rule 8 should be softened where the district court had received
instructions to cabin discovery so as to preserve petitioners’ qualified
immunity. 136 The Court, however, again held that the question presented
by a motion to dismiss did not turn on the controls placed upon the
discovery process. 137 Finally, Iqbal argued that the Federal Rules allowed
him to allege the petitioners’ discriminatory intent generally, based on the
language of Rule 9(b). 138 The Court, however, rejected that “generally”
equates with “conclusory”—as it had described Iqbal’s allegations—and
instead explained that “generally” in the context of Rule 9 was a relative
term used for comparison to the stricter pleading standards of that Rule; a
general claim must still comport with the requirements of Rule 8.139
Justice Souter wrote for a four-Justice dissent. 140 The dissent first
stressed the petitioners’ concession that actual knowledge of subordinate
misconduct and deliberate indifference to it would expose them to
liability. 141 With this concession, the dissent argued, the “complaint
satisfie[d] Rule 8(a)(2).” 142 Instead, the petitioners had a fundamental
misunderstanding of Twombly: “Twombly does not require a court at the
motion-to-dismiss stage to consider whether the factual allegations are
probably true. We made it clear, on the contrary, that a court must take the
allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be.” 143 Rather,
the question was, assuming the truth of the factual allegations, whether the
plaintiff had stated a plausible ground for relief.144 The purpose of
Twombly was to dispense with complaints that alleged conduct consistent

suspected links to the attacks would produce a “disparate, incidental impact” on Arab
Muslims, even though the policy was intended to target “neither Arabs nor Muslims”).
133. See id. at 1952.
134. See id. at 1953.
135. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
136. See id.
137. See id. at 1953–54 (“Because respondent’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is
not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise.”).
138. See id. at 1954; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other
conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”).
139. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (“Rule 8 does not empower respondent to plead the
bare elements of his cause of action, affix the label ‘general allegation,’ and expect his
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.”).
140. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 1954–57 (“Lest there be any mistake, . . . the majority is not narrowing the
scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely.”).
142. Id. at 1957–59.
143. Id. at 1959.
144. See id.
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with both wrongdoing and lawful action; but here, the allegations reported
activity that was “no[t] consistent with legal conduct.”145
The dissent did not believe that the majority had applied Twombly
correctly. 146 Rather, it argued that all allegations must be read in the
context of an entire complaint. 147 Further, it criticized the majority’s
inability to articulate what was and was not a conclusory statement, arguing
that the examples of sufficiently factual allegations selected by the majority
were indistinguishable from other, more “conclusory” allegations. 148
In a separate dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote for himself to defend
the other procedural tools available to trial courts.149 “Neither the briefs
nor the Court’s opinion provides convincing grounds for finding these
alternative case-management tools inadequate, either in general or in the
case before us.” 150
Since Iqbal, the Supreme Court has not given further clarification as to
the scope and meaning of Twombly’s holding. Regardless of the dissents’
criticisms, Iqbal unequivocally extended the Twombly plausibility standard
to all civil actions.151 The lower courts quickly began to apply this standard
in a variety of proceedings before them, although not consistently.152
Following the Iqbal two-step analysis, federal courts now sometimes
dismiss complaints for lacking sufficient factual allegations to show a
plausible entitlement to relief.153

145. See id. at 1960.
146. See id. at 1959–60.
147. See id. at 1960–61.
148. See id. at 1961.
149. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1962.
151. See supra text accompanying note 135.
152. See, e.g., Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 n.7 (4th Cir. 2007) (“In the
wake of Twombly, courts and commentators have been grappling with the decision’s
meaning and reach.”); Chao v. Ballista, 630 F. Supp. 2d 170, 177 (D. Mass. 2009)
(“Plausibility, in this view, is a relative measure.”); Schwartz & Appel, supra note 34, at
1126–27 (acknowledging that plausibility pleading is in its “formative stages” and arguing
that the courts would benefit from a consistent framework to help them determine the
plausibility of a claim); Steinman, supra note 53, at 1357–60 (displaying the quick pace at
which Twombly and Iqbal have been cited since their decision); Ryan Mize, Note, From
Plausibility to Clarity: An Analysis of the Implications of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Possible
Remedies, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1261 (2010) (“The primary disadvantages of current
pleading doctrine are the inconsistency with which it is applied, its general lack of clarity,
and its divergence from traditional liberal notice pleading. The inconsistency leaves litigants
guessing how the judiciary will construe ‘plausibility’ as to the allegations of their
complaint.”). See generally Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study
on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1811 (2008).
153. See, e.g., Inst. for Dev. of Earth Awareness v. People for Ethical Treatment of
Animals, No. 08 Civ. 6195(PKC), 2009 WL 2850230, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009);
Kregler v. City of New York, 646 F. Supp. 2d 570, 574–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated and
remanded, 375 F. App’x 143 (2d Cir. 2010); Willey v. J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A., No. 09 Civ.
1397(CM), 2009 WL 1938987, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2009).
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The plausibility standard has received mixed reviews. 154 The main
public policy consideration underlying Twombly and Iqbal is the Court’s
perception that notice pleading is insufficient to protect defendants against
the high costs associated with modern discovery and litigation; in essence,
notice pleading is no longer an efficient procedural tool.155 Some
commentators support that policy, 156 while others strongly rebuke it. 157
Congress has even been presented with bills designed to reinstate the
Conley standard. 158

154. See generally Mark Herrmann et al., Debate, Plausible Denial: Should Congress
Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141 (2009),
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf (displaying arguments in
support of and criticizing the Twombly standard).
155. See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 34, at 1121 (“Integral to the Court’s new
direction was that the public policy underlying traditional notice pleading no longer provided
the appropriate balance necessary to promote justice and curb frivolous or highly speculative
litigation.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (permitting a party to engage in discovery relating
to any matter pertaining to its claims or defenses).
156. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 473, 484–86 & n.62 (2010) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal are not dramatically out
of line with previous precedent); Schwartz & Appel, supra note 34, at 1139–42 (“In the
modern litigation world, the role of judges to screen the sufficiency of a complaint and
ensure that juries are not led astray by misleading or immaterial information has never been
more critical. Twombly and Iqbal recognize that judges must be empowered to manage
litigation at the pretrial level just as they are throughout other phases of litigation. . . . The
distinguishing benefit of tightening controls at the pretrial stage is that it removes
unsubstantiated claims at the most efficient point in the litigation process, namely the
beginning.”); cf. Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment
on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010) (supporting the “thin screening”
model articulated in Twombly but arguing that the two-prong test of a pleading’s sufficiency
described in Iqbal is more demanding and threatens to screen out meritorious claims, and
further arguing that the Supreme Court is ill-equipped to design a stricter pleading
standard—such a task should be conducted through the formal Rules Enabling Act process).
157. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards on
to Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 274–84 (2009) (arguing that the
plausibility standard threatens to violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial by
removing assessments of factual matters from a jury to the judge); Roger M. Michalski,
Assessing Iqbal, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (Dec. 8, 2010, 5:44 AM),
http://hlpronline.com/2010/12/assessing-iqbal (bemoaning the post-Iqbal legal landscape as
one that keeps socially beneficial litigation out of the courts and contains an increased level
of subjectivity comparable to the period before the plausibility standard came into effect);
Miller, supra note 31, at 10–64 (“[Twombly and Iqbal] mark[] a continued retreat from the
principles of citizen access, private enforcement of public policies, and equality of litigant
treatment in favor of corporate interests and concentrated wealth. . . . [T]he decisions have
unmoored our long-held understanding that the motion to dismiss simply tests a pleading’s
notice-giving and substantive-law sufficiency. . . . Although discovery can be enormously
expensive in a small percentage of federal cases, Twombly and Iqbal have stated a pleading
rule that burdens all cases based on what may be happening in a small fraction of them. For
the great body of litigation, Twombly’s and Iqbal’s cure may be counterproductive and worse
than the supposed disease.”).
158. See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:S.1504:; Open Access to Courts Act
of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/z?c111:H.R.4115:.
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C. Affirmative Defenses
Rule 8, which Twombly interprets, does not only discuss the requirements
for claims; it also discusses affirmative defenses.159 “An affirmative
defense, under the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), is a defense that does
not negate the elements of the plaintiff’s claim, but instead precludes
liability even if all of the elements of the plaintiff’s claim are proven.”160
This section introduces the pleading standard for affirmative defenses in
federal court, as it existed before Twombly. It first discusses how
defendants have traditionally pled affirmative defenses. Then, it describes
the standard to which affirmative defenses are held when they are
challenged by Rule 12(f) motions to strike them from the pleadings.
1. The Traditional Manner of Pleading Affirmative Defenses
Prior to Twombly, generally stated affirmative defenses were usually
sufficient so long as they provided fair notice of the nature of the
defense. 161 Courts held affirmative defenses to a flexible standard, which
tended to resemble the Conley standard for claims. 162 Nevertheless, most
courts also respected the independence of Rule 8(c) in governing the
pleading of affirmative defenses. 163 Accordingly, defendants frequently
pled simple lists or recitations of their defenses.164 For instance, the court

159. See supra note 35.
160. Roberge v. Hannah Marine Corp., No. 96-1691, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21655, at *7
(6th Cir. Aug. 13, 1997).
161. See Clem v. Corbeau, 98 F. App’x 197, 203 (4th Cir. 2004); Wyshak v. City Nat’l
Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979) (“The key to determining the sufficiency of
pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.”);
Baum v. Faith Techs., Inc., No. 10-CV-0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL 2365451, at *2 (N.D.
Okla. June 9, 2010) (citing many decisions to so hold); see also 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1274 (3d ed. 2004) (“[A]n
affirmative defense may be pleaded in general terms and will be held to be sufficient, and
therefore invulnerable to a motion to strike, as long as it gives the plaintiff fair notice of the
nature of the defense.”).
162. See, e.g., Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 & n.27 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing
Rule 8(e)’s language that “requir[es] all pleadings to be ‘simple, concise, and direct’” to
conclude that its pleading standard for affirmative defenses is the same standard to which
claims are held); FSP, Inc. v. Societe Generale, No. 02CV4786GBD, 2005 WL 475986, at
*8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2005) (asserting that an affirmative defense should not be struck
unless it seems certain that the plaintiffs will prevail “despite any state of facts which could
be proved in support of the [affirmative] defense”—effectively the same standard used to
examine claims under Conley).
163. See, e.g., Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656, 657 n.1 (6th Cir. 1988) (“Rule 8(b)
does not apply when a defendant asserts an affirmative defense . . . .”); Bernal v. Daewoo
Motor Am., Inc., No. CV09-1502 PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 3837195, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 16,
2009) (“Rule 8(b), however, does not apply to affirmative defenses. . . . The Court will not
strike [defendant’s] affirmative defenses on the ground that they do not comply with Rule
8(b).”); Gen. Electric Capital Corp. v. Lanmann, No. 2:05-CV-1130, 2006 WL 2077103, at
*2 (S.D. Ohio July 24, 2006) (“[I]t is settled that ‘Rule 8(b) does not apply when a defendant
asserts an affirmative defense.’” (quoting Pollock, 845 F.2d at 657 n.1)). But see Shinew v.
Wszola, Civil Action No. 08-14256, 2009 WL 1076279, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2009).
164. See Romantine v. CH2M Hill Eng’rs, Inc., Civil Action No. 09-973, 2009 WL
3417469, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2009); Miller, supra note 31, at 101 (“[D]efensive
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in Woodfield v. Bowman 165 stated that a defendant must plead an
affirmative defense with “enough specificity or factual particularity to give
the plaintiff ‘fair notice’ of the defense that is being advanced;” however, in
some instances, “merely pleading the name of the affirmative defense . . .
may be sufficient.” 166 The courts may have allowed the liberal pleading of
affirmative defenses because a defendant risks waiving any affirmative
defense that it does not plead. 167
For an example of how the federal courts handled affirmative defenses
before Twombly, consider Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 168 a U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit decision from 1998. Davis involved a dispute over a
sale of land by defendant Sun Oil to the Davises, which land was formerly
used as a gasoline filling station.169 Sun Oil did not properly remove
underground equipment before the sale and the Davises brought actions in
both state and federal court on account of the omission.170 The federal
action for environmental damage was stayed pending the state action for
breach of contract and fraud, in which the Davises were victorious.171
The Sixth Circuit found that Sun Oil did not acquiesce to the Davises’
claim splitting and thereby waive its res judicata defense in the federal
action, because Sun Oil had stated in its answer that “[p]laintiffs’ claims are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.”172 The majority held that Sun Oil
could rely upon that succinctly stated affirmative defense; the plaintiffs had
not been treated unjustly and had been given fair notice of the defense.173
Judge Danny Julian Boggs, however, dissented in part from the
majority’s decision based on his belief that Sun Oil’s pleading of res
judicata was insufficient. 174 The dissent noted the boilerplate nature of the
defense. 175 Conceding that there was no technical form of pleading
required, the dissent argued that pleading in an “intelligible manner” is not
formalism. 176 Sun Oil’s “cloudy answer” did not suffice to supply fair
pleading[s] typically are alleged in a formulary, conclusory, and uninformative fashion along
the style illustrated in Form 30 [of the Federal Rules].”).
165. 193 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1999).
166. Id. at 362 & n.27 (citing Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Napoli, 166 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.
1948) (“Under our very liberal rules of pleading . . . . [a] plea that simply states that
complainant was guilty of contributory negligence, as in the case at bar, is sufficient.”)).
167. See Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:09cv737, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77083, at *19–20 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010); see also Wanamaker v. Albrecht, No. 958061, 1996 WL 582738, at *5 (10th Cir. Oct. 10, 1996) (“While counsel often plead vast
numbers of affirmative defenses without being sure whether the facts will ultimately support
the defenses, such pleading is done precisely so that the defenses will be preserved should
discovery or further proceedings reveal factual support.”); Baum v. Faith Techs., Inc., No.
10-CV-0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL 2365451, at *3 (N.D. Okla. June 9, 2010).
168. 148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998).
169. See id. at 608.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 608–09.
172. See id. at 612 (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. See id. at 612–13.
174. See id. at 613 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
175. See id. at 614.
176. See id.
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notice of its objection to the Davises’ separate state and federal actions.177
“The prejudice to the Davises is obvious.” 178
2. Judicial Assessment of the Sufficiency of Affirmative Defense
Pleadings: Rule 12(f) Motions To Strike
The Federal Rules do provide some recourse to plaintiffs who wish to
remove inappropriate affirmative defenses from an answer. Rule 12(f)
allows a party to move the court to strike affirmative defenses from an
opponent’s pleading. 179 This can allow the court and parties to avoid
spending time and money litigating spurious issues.180
Traditionally, the courts grant motions to strike when the plaintiff would
succeed despite any pled or inferable set of facts in support of the
challenged defense. 181 In other words, an affirmative defense is insufficient
if it is not recognized as a valid defense against the claim. 182 However,
when reviewing a motion to strike, the court must view the pleading under
attack in the light most favorable to the pleader.183 An affirmative defense
will not be struck unless its insufficiency is clearly apparent, it does not
present relevant questions of law or fact, and its retention is prejudicial to
the moving party. 184 Prejudice may be displayed if the answer does not
clearly articulate to which claim an affirmative defense applies, or if an
affirmative defense has no possible relation to the controversy. 185
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (“The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court may act:
(1) on its own; or (2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or,
if a response is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the pleading.”).
180. See Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *4
(W.D. Va. June 24, 2010); Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program,
718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Versata Enters.,
Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 395, 402 (D. Del. 2009) (“Motions to strike serve ‘to clean up the
pleadings, streamline litigation, and avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial matters.’”
(quoting McInerney v. Moyer Lumber & Hardware, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 393, 402 (E.D. Pa.
2002))); Fogel v. Linnemann (In re Mission Bay Ski & Bike, Inc.), No. 07 B 20870, No. 08
A 55, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2495, at *8–9 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2009) (“Motions to strike
can be useful, however, as a way to remove unnecessary clutter from the case, and then they
serve to expedite, not delay.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
181. See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Pennsalt Chems.Corp., 262 F. Supp. 101, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
182. See Huertas v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 08-3959 (RBK/JS), 2009 WL 2132429, at
*1 (D.N.J. July 13, 2009).
183. See Clark v. Milam, 152 F.R.D. 66, 71 (S.D. W. Va. 1993).
184. See id. at 70; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir.
1986), rev’d on other grounds, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Palmer, 2010 WL 2605179, at *2;
Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 649 (D. Kan. 2009); 5C WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 161, § 1381.
185. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th
Cir. 1953); Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:09cv737, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77083, at *14 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010); HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F.
Supp. 2d 687, 689 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Benjamin v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 1:08-cv-101, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48677, at *1–2 (D.V.I. June 4, 2009); Greenheck Fan Corp. v. Loren Cook
Co., No. 08-cv-335-jps, 2008 WL 4443805, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 25, 2008) (“Failing to

2011]

TWOMBLY& AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

2195

Rule 12(f) motions to strike are generally disfavored, and courts
frequently characterize them as “time wasters” that potentially serve only to
delay a proceeding. 186 Moreover, a motion to strike is a drastic remedy and
should not be used frequently, in part because of the difficulty of deciding
cases without a factual record, 187 as well as the strong policy favoring
resolution on the merits. 188 Accordingly, a defendant whose defense has
been struck is normally granted leave to amend. 189
II. DOES THE TWOMBLY STANDARD EXTEND TO AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES?
As this Note discussed earlier, the courts in Shinew 190 and First
National 191 both use Davis 192 as precedent, but to very different results.193
After Twombly, the continued validity of the traditional manners of
pleading affirmative defenses and determining their sufficiency are in
doubt. Building upon the discussion in Part I of the Federal Rules and
pleading standards, Part II explores the arguments presented by the district
courts for either extending the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses or
not. First, it considers those courts that have decided that the Twombly
standard does extend to affirmative defenses. Part II.A.I discusses the
notions of fairness presented by these courts in extending Twombly. Part
II.A.2 discusses the policy justifications for extending the Twombly
standard, including preventing discovery abuse and limiting boilerplate
defensive pleadings. Finally, Part II.A.3 describes the efforts of these
courts to temper the potential harshness of their rulings to extend the
Twombly standard by allowing leave to amend. This part then considers
those courts that have decided that the Twombly standard does not extend to
affirmative defenses. Part II.B.1 discusses these courts’ reading of Rule 8,
upon which they heavily rely in their decisions not to extend Twombly. Part
II.B.2 discusses the other Federal Rules, policy considerations, and notions
properly notify is prejudice.”); Westbrook v. Paragon Sys., Inc., Civil Action 07-0714-WSC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88490, at *2–3 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2007).
186. See Greenheck, 2008 WL 4443805, at *1 (“[A] motion to strike pleadings or
affirmative defenses is generally disfavored because it consumes scarce judicial resources,
and potentially serve[s] to delay . . . .” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No. 07-80551-CIV, 2008 WL
2225668, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 2008) (listing many decisions to so describe); 5C WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 161, § 1380.
187. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 201 F.2d at 822 (“Partly because of the
practical difficulty of deciding cases without a factual record it is well established that the
action of striking a pleading should be sparingly used by the courts. It is a drastic remedy to
be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice.” (citation omitted)); Knit With
v. Knitting Fever, Inc., Civil Action Nos. 08-4221, 08-4775, 2009 WL 973492, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 8, 2009).
188. See Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d
1167, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
189. See Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228, 232 (E.D.N.C. 2010);
Francisco, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77083, at *15; Palmer, 2010 WL 2605179, at *2.
190. See supra notes 1–7, 14–20 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 168–78.
193. See supra notes 8–20 and accompanying text.
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of fairness that influence these courts’ reasoning. Lastly, Part II.B.3
addresses those courts that have remained silent on the issue, but whose
silence implies reluctance to extend the Twombly standard to affirmative
defenses.
A. The Twombly Standard Does Extend to Affirmative Defenses
The majority of courts that have considered the question have found that
the Twombly standard does extend to affirmative defenses.194 However,
this is not to say that they have all ruled similarly; even within this subset,
there is some variation. For example, where an affirmative defense must
display multiple elements to prove eventually successful, some courts have
not required each of those elements to be supported with factual allegations,
while other courts have dismissed affirmative defenses composed of many
elements for failure to support each.195
This section describes the major points upon which the district courts that
extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses rely. First, it discusses
judicial notions of fairness in decisions to extend the standard. Next, it
addresses the use of the Twombly standard to prevent discovery abuse and
boilerplate defensive pleadings. Finally, it describes judicial liberality in
allowing defendants to amend insufficient defensive pleadings.
1. What Is Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander
The seeming unfairness of applying a different standard of pleading to
claims and affirmative defenses drives many courts to reason that the two
standards should be the same. 196 Because affirmative defenses are
pleadings, they are subject to the same requirements as any other
pleading. 197 To reach this conclusion, some courts rely upon precedent that
194. See Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d
1167, 1171 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2010). At least one commentator supports extension. See
Mize, supra note 152, at 1260–61.
195. Compare Teirstein v. AGA Med. Corp., No. 6:08cv14, 2009 WL 704138, at *8
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2009) (“As Plaintiff points out, a successful claim of laches or equitable
estoppel requires many elements. However, at the pleading stage, the burden is far less;
Defendant need only meet the requirements of Rule 8.” (citation omitted)), with T-Mobile
USA, Inc. v. Wireless Exclusive USA, LLC, No. 3:08-CV-0340-G, 2008 WL 2600016, at *3
(N.D. Tex. July 1, 2008) (“The defendants have failed to sufficiently allege the fourth
element [of an antitrust anti-tying affirmative defense]; consequently, the defense is
insufficient as a matter of law and is stricken . . . .”).
196. See Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228, 234 (E.D.N.C. 2010); Palmer
v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *4–5 (W.D. Va. June 24,
2010).
197. See OSF Healthcare Sys. v. Banno, No. 08-CV-1096, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7584,
at *2–3 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010) (“[Affirmative defenses] are subject to all pleading
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Affirmative defenses thus must be set
forth in short and plain statement[s] . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .
[Twombly and Iqbal are] equally applicable to affirmative defenses, given that affirmative
defenses are subject to those same pleading requirements.” (alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Greenheck Fan Corp. v. Loren Cook Co., No.
08-cv-335-jps, 2008 WL 4443805, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 25, 2008) (“Because affirmative
defenses are pleadings, they are governed by Rule 8’s requirement of a short and plain
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suggests that affirmative defenses are judged by the same pleading
requirements as complaints. 198 “[T]he purpose of pleading requirements is
the same. . . . [The] standard simply means than [sic] that it be pleaded in a
way that is intelligible, gives fair notice, and is plausibly suggested by the
facts.” 199 “[W]hat is good for the goose is good for the gander . . . .” 200
The courts’ problem with some tersely phrased affirmative defenses is
that they do not provide plaintiffs with fair notice of the defenses.201 It is
not the responsibility of the court or the opposing party to interpret what a
defendant meant by tersely worded affirmative defenses.202 “An evenstatement of the defense.” (citing Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286,
1294 (7th Cir. 1989))); Stoffels ex rel. SBC Tel. Concession Plan v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc.,
No. 05-CV-0233-WWJ, 2008 WL 4391396, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008) (holding that
because the Rules “require affirmative defenses to be pleaded” then the “pleading specificity
standard” articulated by Twombly applies); Fogel v. Linnemann (In re Mission Bay Ski &
Bike, Inc.), No. 07 B 20870, No. 08 A 55, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2495, at *15–16 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. Sept. 9, 2009) (“Affirmative defenses are pleadings and so are subject to all pleading
requirements under the Federal Rules. That means affirmative defenses must meet the
notice-pleading standards of Rule 8(a) as the Supreme Court recently interpreted them in
[Twombly and Iqbal].” (citations omitted)).
198. See Cosmetic Warriors Ltd. v. Lush Boutique, L.L.C., No. 09-6381, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16392, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2010) (“The Fifth Circuit held in Woodfield v.
Bowman that an affirmative defense is subject to the same pleading requirements as the
Complaint.” (citing Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999))); Tracy v.
NVR, Inc., No. 04-CV-6541L, 2009 WL 3153150, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) (citing
FSP, Inc. v. Societe Generale, No. 02CV4786GBD, 2005 WL 475986, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
28, 2005) (suggesting that a motion to strike an affirmative defense under Rule 12(f) is
governed by the same standard as a motion to dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) by
asserting that an affirmative defense should not be struck unless it seems certain that the
plaintiffs will prevail “despite any state of facts which could be proved in support of the
[affirmative] defense”—effectively the same standard used to examine claims under
Conley); Solvent Chem. Co. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 242 F. Supp. 2d 196, 212
(W.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that “[t]he standard for striking an affirmative defense is the
mirror image” of that which is used to determine whether a pleading has failed to state a
claim)); Teirstein v. AGA Med. Corp., No. 6:08cv14, 2009 WL 704138, at *2 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 16, 2009) (citing Woodfield in a manner similar to Cosmetic Warriors); Aspex
Eyewear, Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (relying
upon Societe Generale in a manner similar to Tracy); Stoffels, 2008 WL 4391396, at *1
(citing Woodfield in a manner similar to Cosmetic Warriors); T-Mobile USA, 2008 WL
2600016, at *2 (using Woodfield in a manner similar to Cosmetic Warriors).
199. Palmer, 2010 WL 2605179, at *5 (“Such a requirement is in no way inconsistent
with Rule 8(a)(2)’s ‘short and plain statement of the claim’ language. Likewise, is neither
inconsistent with Rule 8(b)(1)(A)’s requirement that a defendant ‘state in short and plain
terms its defenses to each claim’ nor with Rule 8(d)(1)’s requirement that all pleadings be
‘simple, concise, and direct.’”); see also Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647,
650 (D. Kan. 2009) (“In both instances, the purpose of pleading requirements is to provide
enough notice to the opposing party that indeed there is some plausible, factual basis for the
assertion and not simply a suggestion of possibility that it may apply to the case.”).
200. Racick, 270 F.R.D. at 233.
201. See Burget v. Capital W. Sec., Inc., No. CIV-09-1015-M, 2009 WL 4807619, at *3
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 8, 2009); see also FDIC v. Bristol Home Mortg. Lending, LLC, No. 0881536-CIV, 2009 WL 2488302, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2009) (“Although Rule 8 does not
obligate a defendant to set forth detailed factual allegations, a defendant must give the
plaintiff ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the defense and the grounds upon which it rests.”);
Greenheck, 2008 WL 4443805, at *2.
202. See CTF Dev., Inc. v. Penta Hospitality, LLC, No. C 09-02429 WHA, 2009 WL
3517617, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2009).
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handed standard as related to pleadings ensures that the affirmative defenses
supply enough information to explain the parameters of and basis for an
affirmative defense such that the adverse party can reasonably tailor
discovery.” 203 Because the rationale of Twombly impacts both parties to a
dispute, it makes sense to extend the standard.204
Furthermore, the similarities in language between Rule 8(a) and Rule
8(b) indicates to some courts that the pleading standard of affirmative
defenses is the same as that for complaints. 205 To these courts, the
language of Rule 8(c) is not independent of the other sections of Rule 8, but
rather imposes additional requirements upon the pleading of affirmative
defenses on top of those imposed by Rule 8(b)’s “short and plain terms”
language. 206
2. Discovery Abuse and Boilerplate Pleadings
In addition to reliance upon notions of simple fairness, courts that decide
to extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses frequently do so
“[b]ecause of the widespread abuse of affirmative defenses and related
judicial acquiescence at times in such practices.”207 These courts tend to
pursue two objectives: the prevention of unnecessary discovery and the
streamlining of boilerplate defensive pleadings. 208
Some district courts have hearkened to the “underlying rationale” of
Twombly in their decisions to extend the Twombly standard to affirmative
defenses. 209 To these courts, Twombly is designed to eliminate the
potential high costs of discovery associated with meritless claims, and
“[b]oilerplate affirmative defenses . . . can have the same detrimental effect

203. Burget, 2009 WL 4807619, at *2.
204. See Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77083, at
*17 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010).
205. See, e.g., HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (N.D. Ohio
2010); see also supra note 35.
206. See Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650 (D. Kan. 2009)
(“Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 is consistent in at least inferring that the pleading requirements for
affirmative defenses are essentially the same as for claims for relief. Although Rule 8(c) for
affirmative defenses does not contain the same language as 8(a)(2), requiring ‘a short and
plain statement of the claim,’ 8(b)(1)(A) nevertheless does require a defendant to ‘state in
short and plain terms its defenses to each claim.’ The sub-heading for Rule 8(b)(1),
moreover, is ‘Defenses; In General.’ Rule 8(c)(1) provides a helpful laundry list of
commonly asserted affirmative defenses to emphasize that avoidances and affirmative
defenses must indeed be pleaded to be preserved. Applying the standard for heightened
pleading to affirmative defenses serves a valid purpose in requiring at least some valid
factual basis for pleading an affirmative defense and not adding it to the case simply upon
some conjecture that it may somehow apply.”).
207. See United States v. Quadrini, No. 2:07-CV-13227, 2007 WL 4303213, at *6 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 6, 2007).
208. See Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228, 233 (E.D.N.C. 2010)
(“‘[B]oilerplate defenses clutter the docket and . . . create unnecessary work’ and extend[]
discovery.” (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O’Hara Corp., No. 08-CV-10545, 2008 WL
2558015, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008))).
209. See HCRI TRS, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 691; see also supra note 155 and accompanying
text.
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on the cost of litigation.” 210 In this view, if an affirmative defense is
unnecessary, then discovery in support of it is wasteful and, therefore, a
plaintiff should not have to wait to find out whether it has merit. 211 Just as
Twombly considered the burdens of discovery related to non-meritorious
claims, these courts considered the burden of discovery related to nonmeritorious defenses.212
Similarly, these courts take a practical approach to their decisions, using
the Twombly standard as a tool through which they might clear their
dockets or improve the quality of the pleadings before them. 213 These
courts require attorneys before them to “accept a continuing obligation to
eliminate unnecessary boilerplate in their pleadings.” 214 Claims and
defenses not currently sustainable under Rule 11 are “frivolous” and should
be stricken. 215 These courts “require[] more than the assertion of any and
all defenses that may apply. Such defenses fall within the ambit of
Twombly and [these courts’] preferred practice . . . .” 216
3. Amending Pleadings
The courts that extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses for
fairness and policy reasons usually permit amendment of the answer 217 to

210. HCRI TRS, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
211. See Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *5
(W.D. Va. June 24, 2010) (“[Plaintiffs should] not be left to the formal discovery process to
find-out whether the defense exists and may, instead, use the discovery process for its
intended purpose of ascertaining the additional facts which support a well-pleaded claim or
defense.”); FDIC v. Bristol Home Mortg. Lending, LLC, No. 08-81536-CIV, 2009 WL
2488302, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2009) (“‘On the other hand, weeding out legally
insufficient defenses at an early stage of a complicated lawsuit may be extremely valuable to
all concerned in order to avoid the needless expenditures of time and money in litigating
issues which can be seen to have no bearing on the outcome.’” (quoting First Specialty Ins.
Corp. v. GRS Mgmt. Assocs., No. 08-81356-CIV, 2009 WL 2169869, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July
20, 2009))).
212. See, e.g., Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
77083, at *23–24, *27 n.8 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010) (“This manner of pleading serves to
narrow the issues for discovery and propels the litigation forward so that the Court may
swiftly and efficiently hear the merits of a plaintiff’s claims.”); Barnes v. AT&T Pension
Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding
prejudice to the plaintiff in the continued existence of the affirmative defenses in the
pleadings, because the plaintiff would need to conduct discovery that would be “expensive
and potentially unnecessary and irrelevant”).
213. See, e.g., Safeco, 2008 WL 2558015, at *1(“Boilerplate defenses clutter the docket
and, further, create unnecessary work. Opposing counsel generally must respond to such
defenses with interrogatories or other discovery aimed at ascertaining which defenses are
truly at issue and which are merely asserted without factual basis but in an abundance of
caution. The court is aware of only a limited class of defenses that are waived if not
immediately asserted. Rule 15 allows for appropriate amendments and counsel should
therefore feel no need in this court to window-dress pleadings early for fear of losing
defenses later.”).
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. Id. (extending the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses without analysis).
217. See supra note 5.
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allow defendants the opportunity to satisfy the more rigorous standard.218
The liberal application of Rule 15 motions to amend is designed to “soften[]
any painful blow” caused by the extension. 219 The courts recognize that
parties do not always know all the facts relevant to their claims or defenses
until discovery has occurred. 220 While that is not usually enough to
overcome a Rule 12(f) motion to strike, 221 the Federal Rules contemplate
such circumstances by allowing for amendment upon the acquisition of
additional relevant information.222
B. The Twombly Standard Does Not Extend to Affirmative Defenses
A sizable minority of courts that have considered whether the Twombly
standard extends to affirmative defenses have found that it does not.223
This section discusses the most common arguments of these courts. First, it
explores judicial interpretation of Rule 8. Next, it considers other Rules,
policy, and judicial concepts of fairness that influence courts’ reasoning.
Finally, it examines those courts that have selected not to rule upon the
controversy when presented with the opportunity, but whose refusal to rule
suggests that they are reluctant to extend the Twombly standard.
1. Rule 8 Differentiates Between Claims and Affirmative Defenses
The most prevalent argument against extending the Twombly standard to
affirmative defenses is based upon the language and structure of Rule 8.224
Rule 8(a) governs the pleading of complaints and requires “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”225
In contrast, Rule 8(c) specifies “only that affirmative defenses be ‘set forth
218. See, e.g., Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 652 (D. Kan. 2009)
(“The majority of cases applying the Twombly pleading standard to affirmative defenses and
striking those defenses have permitted the defendant leave to amend.”).
219. See Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77083, at
*25 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010).
220. See Teirstein v. AGA Med. Corp., No. 6:08cv14, 2009 WL 704138, at *8 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 16, 2009) (declining to strike an affirmative defense of limitation of damages because,
at that point in the litigation, the plaintiff had not provided any details regarding his
damages); see also Stoffels ex rel. SBC Tel. Concession Plan v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., No.
05-CV-0233-WWJ, 2008 WL 4391396, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008) (declining to
strike an affirmative defense of statute of limitations and suggesting that the court was
persuaded by defendant’s argument that it could not provide detailed factual allegations in its
pleading because plaintiffs had not specifically alleged when the claim had occurred). The
Stoffels court noted that the statute of limitations affirmative defense “is largely selfexplanatory and is sufficient to give plaintiffs fair notice” of the asserted defense. See id.at
*2. In similar scenarios, other courts have stricken the affirmative defense with leave to
amend. See, e.g., Hayne, 263 F.R.D. at 651–52. However, some courts have not. See, e.g.,
Burget v. Capital W. Sec. Inc., No. CIV-09-1015-M, 2009 WL 4807619, at *3–4 (W.D.
Okla. Dec. 8, 2009) (striking with prejudice an affirmative defense of statute of limitations,
despite defendant’s argument that it had insufficient information regarding plaintiff’s claims
to determine whether they were time-barred).
221. See supra Part I.C.2.
222. See Hayne, 263 F.R.D. at 651.
223. See Francisco, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77083, at *19–21.
224. See supra note 35 (reproducing FED. R. CIV. P. 8).
225. See supra note 35.

2011]

TWOMBLY& AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

2201

affirmatively.’” 226 Rule 8(c) does not require that the answer “show” that
the defendant is entitled to prevail on his affirmative defense.227 Moreover,
Twombly was decided under Rule 8(a) and its language does not suggest
that its standard was intended to extend to affirmative defenses under Rule
8(c). 228 Accordingly, both the structure and language of the Federal Rules
contemplate different treatment of claims and affirmative defenses. Many
courts have used similar reasoning to conclude that the Twombly standard
does not extend to affirmative defenses.229
For example, the court in Charleswell v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.230
held for largely textual reasons that the Twombly standard did not extend to
affirmative defenses:
Twombly interpreted Rule 8(a)(2), which states that a pleading must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Rule 8(c)(1), which provides for affirmative
defenses, states only that “a party must affirmatively state any avoidance
or affirmative defense.” There is no requirement under Rule 8(c) that a
defendant “show” any facts at all. 231

226. Westbrook v. Paragon Sys., Inc., No. 07-0714-WS-C, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88490,
at *2 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2007) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)). Although Westbrook quoted a
previous version of Rule 8(c), the substance remains the same. See supra text accompanying
note 32.
227. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, No. 09-CV-2764 (PJS/AJB), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 114983, at *4–5 (D. Minn. Oct. 27, 2010) (highlighting that an affirmative
defense is not a claim for relief and that no Federal Rule requires a defendant to plead “facts
‘showing’ that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief”); Westbrook, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
88490, at *2.
228. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 & n.3 (2007); Westbrook,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88490, at *2.
229. See, e.g., Lopez v. Asmar’s Mediterranean Food, Inc., No. 1:10cv1218 (JCC), 2011
WL 98573, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2011) (“Such policy considerations [as relied upon by
courts to extend the Twombly standard] may be compelling, but whether this Court agrees
with them or not, it is first bound to apply the relevant rules of civil procedure as written.”);
Ameristar Fence Prods., Inc. v. Phoenix Fence Co., No. CV-10-299-PHX-DGC, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 81468, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2010) (stressing the individuality of Rule 8(c)
in its governance of affirmative defenses, emphasizing that that Rule requires only that a
party “state” an avoidance or affirmative defense, and declining to extend the Twombly
standard to affirmative defenses, leaving such an action “to the Supreme Court or this
Circuit”); McLemore v. Regions Bank, Nos. 3:08-cv-0021, 3:08-cv-1003, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25785, at *42–49 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010) (discussing how the Twombly and
Iqbal decisions only concerned themselves with plaintiffs’ complaints and Rule 8(a)(2), and
holding that affirmative defenses are not required to plead supporting facts); Romantine v.
CH2M Hill Eng’rs, Inc., No. 09-973, 2009 WL 3417469, at *1 & n.1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23,
2009) (reasoning that, despite any similarities between the language of Rule 8(a) and 8(b),
affirmative defenses are governed by Rule 8(c), and holding that the Supreme court in
Twombly was interpreting the pleading requirements for claims under Rule 8(a)(2) only);
Am. Res. Ins. Co. v. Evoleno Co., No. 07-0035-WS-M, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55181, at *6
n.7 (S.D. Ala. July 30, 2007) (emphasizing that the “showing” element of Rule 8(a) is that
which requires some factual allegation, while neither Rule 8(b) nor Rule 8(c) requires the
answer to “show” that the defendant is entitled to prevail on its affirmative defense).
230. No. 01-119, 2009 WL 4981730 (D.V.I. Dec. 8, 2009).
231. Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
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Under this interpretation of the law, the court upheld all of the defendants’
challenged affirmative defenses, finding that a defendant is not required to
allege facts in support of an affirmative defense.232
2. Other Rules, Policy Considerations, and Fairness
The language of Rule 8 is not the only concern for those district courts
that have declined to extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses.
Courts have also relied upon other Federal Rules, policy considerations, and
notions of simple fairness to defendants in their decisions not to extend the
Twombly standard.
The Federal Rules provide plaintiffs with several protections from
defendants who poorly craft affirmative defenses. Hearkening to Justice
Stevens’ dissent in Twombly, 233 the court in Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace,
Inc. 234 reasoned that when an affirmative defense does not provide enough
facts to give fair notice of the claim for the plaintiff to respond properly, a
motion to strike under Rule 12(f) is not the appropriate remedy. 235 The
court suggested that if a pleading fails to specify allegations so as to provide
sufficient notice or does not contain enough information to allow for a
responsive pleading to be framed, the proper motion to file is a Rule 12(e)
motion for a more definite statement. 236 While the court did apply
Twombly to the affirmative defenses before it, it only did so as far as its
interpretation of that standard reconciled with notice pleading of affirmative
defenses, denying plaintiff’s motion to strike and granting in the alternative
a motion for a more definite statement.237 In other words, the Federal
Rules already provided a means of questioning the language of an
affirmative defense.
Similarly, the Federal Rules require that factual contentions made to a
court have evidentiary support or will likely so have after “reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”238 Failure to satisfy
these conditions can result in sanctions for attorneys, law firms, and
parties. 239 Both parties must make “an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances” before making presentations to the court.240 However, the
time that is available to make these inquiries differs for a plaintiff, under the

232. See id. at *5–6.
233. See supra text accompanying note 94.
234. No. 07-80551-CIV, 2008 WL 2225668 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 2008).
235. See id. at *2.
236. See id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) (“A party may move for a more definite
statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or
ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made
before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the
details desired. If the court orders a more definite statement and the order is not obeyed
within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time the court sets, the court may strike
the pleading or issue any other appropriate order.”).
237. See Holtzman, 2008 WL 2225668, at *2.
238. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
239. See id. 11(c).
240. See id. 11(b).
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applicable statute of limitations, and for a defendant, under the Federal
Rules. 241 District courts have reasoned that these differences justify
different treatment of plaintiffs and defendants at the pleading stage. 242 To
these courts, it is unfair to extend the Twombly standard to defendants when
a plaintiff has months or years to investigate a claim before pleading, while
a defendant “typically has [twenty-one] days to serve an answer.” 243
Practical considerations have also influenced courts’ decisions not to
extend the Twombly standard. Because of the limited time available to
them, defendants have frequently simply listed their affirmative defenses in
their answer. 244 Some courts view these listings as tools of the trade and
would select not to penalize defendants by striking pleadings that are
allowed under the Rules. 245 In a typical case, it becomes apparent which
affirmative defenses are not viable, and the parties disregard them; “[n]o
judicial intervention is necessary.” 246 Extending the Twombly standard to
affirmative defenses may compel defendants to move the court more
frequently for permission to amend its answer after discovery to add
affirmative defenses. 247 Plaintiffs would naturally resist those motions, and
this could lead to another round of motion practice, in many cases
“increasing the burdens on the federal courts, and adding expense and delay
for the parties.” 248

241. See id. 12(a)(1)(A) (“A defendant must serve an answer: (i) within 21 days after
being served with the summons and complaint . . . .”).
242. See, e.g., Holdbrook v. Saia Motor Freight Line, LLC, No. 09-cv-02870-LTB-BNB,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29377, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2010) (“[I]t is reasonable to impose
stricter pleading requirements on a plaintiff who has significantly more time to develop
factual support for his claims than a defendant who is only given 20 days to respond to a
complaint and assert its affirmative defenses.”).
243. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, No. 09-CV-2764 (PJS/AJB), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 114983, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 27, 2010) (“Whatever one thinks of Iqbal and
Twombly, the ‘plausibility’ requirement that they impose is more fairly imposed on plaintiffs
who have years to investigate than on defendants who have 21 days.”).
244. See supra notes 161–67 and accompanying text.
245. See Wells Fargo, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114983, at *5 (arguing that extending the
Twombly standard would “radically change” federal civil practice, because affirmative
defenses are almost always simply listed in answers).
246. Id. at *6; see also Westbrook v. Paragon Sys., Inc., No. 07-0714-WS-C, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 88490, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2007) (“The Court fully expects the defendant
to isolate those defenses that are truly affirmative and that are legitimately at issue without
wasting the time of the Court or the plaintiff.”).
247. See Wells Fargo, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114983, at *6.
248. Id.; see also Miller, supra note 31, at 89, 102–03 (“Once again, sounding a
pragmatic note, there are potential litigation cost and delay consequences to these
amendment questions. If Rule 15 does survive unscathed, the growing number of dismissalmotion grants will generate additional amendment requests and grants of leave to replead,
and in many instances a second motion to dismiss following that repleading. On the other
hand, if the application of Rule 15 is narrowed, more judgments following Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissals will be entered and additional appeals from denials of dismissals and leave to
replead are likely to result. . . . In reality, any increase in the burden of pleading . . . the
plausibility of denials and affirmative defenses, also would cause cost and delay
consequences that would have to be considered in determining whether efficiency and cost
savings actually were being realized from the shift to plausibility pleading.”).
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3. Courts Have Been Reluctant To Extend the Twombly Standard to
Affirmative Defenses
Subsequent to Twombly and Iqbal, some district courts, faced with an
opportunity to decisively rule on the issue of this Note, have declined to do
so. 249 The reasoning of these courts frequently suggests that they do not
believe that the Twombly standard should extend to affirmative defenses in
a Draconian way. 250
For example, in Voeks v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 251 the court was asked to
decide a motion to strike a laundry list of affirmative defenses. The
plaintiff argued that the Twombly standard applied and the defendant, citing
Woodfield, 252 claimed that a succinctly stated affirmative defense could
provide appropriate notice. 253 The court, however, did not agree that there
was an issue in controversy on this point at all: “Despite the arguments of
the parties to the contrary, the pleading requirements outlined in Twombly
and Woodfield are not materially different.”254
Specific facts, the court found, were not necessary under either standard,
and both existed only to give fair notice; the factual specificity required to
give notice, “if any,” depended on the circumstance of the parties and the
specific pleading. 255 The court upheld several affirmative defenses, despite
a lack of detail in the pleading, because they were “largely selfNext, the court upheld affirmative defenses that
explanatory.” 256
“sufficiently inform[ed]” the plaintiff of the issues raised because “[i]t
would not be reasonable to expect the defendant to have detailed
information about [the affirmative defenses] at this early stage of the
litigation.” 257 The court did strike several equitable affirmative defenses
249. See, e.g., Del-Nat Tire Corp. v. A to Z Tire & Battery, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-02457-JPMtmp, 2009 WL 4884435, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 8, 2009) (declining to address the issue);
Schlottman v. Unit Drilling Co., No. Civ-08-1275-C, 2009 WL 1764855, at *1 (W.D. Okla.
June 18, 2009) (declining to address whether the Twombly standard extends to affirmative
defenses); Knit With v. Knitting Fever, Inc., Nos. 08-4221, 08-4775, 2009 WL 973492, at
*10–11 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2009) (selecting not to address Twombly’s applicability to
affirmative defenses despite plaintiffs’ motion to strike an affirmative defense on grounds of
“factual insufficiency,” but rather applying a traditional standard of review for a Rule 12(f)
motion to strike and concluding that the court could not find that there existed no set of facts
under which the affirmative defense could succeed—an application of the Conley standard).
250. See, e.g., Baum v. Faith Techs., Inc., No. 10-CV-0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL
2365451, at *3 (N.D. Okla. June 9, 2010) (deciding on defendant’s contested motion to
amend without holding that Twombly is the correct standard by which affirmative defenses
are to be judged); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 395, 402,
407 n.8 (D. Del. 2009) (acknowledging that the parties’ contentions present an opportunity
for the court to resolve the issue, but declining to apply the Twombly standard to the
contested affirmative defenses while instead effectively applying the notice standard).
251. No. 07-C-0030, 2008 WL 89434 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 7, 2008).
252. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text.
253. See Voeks, 2008 WL 89434, at *6.
254. Id.
255. See id.
256. See id. (denying motions to strike affirmative defenses of statute of limitations,
mistake, no damages, speculative damages, insufficient intent, and standing).
257. Id. (denying motions to strike affirmative defenses of offset and failure to mitigate).
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for failing to provide the plaintiff with fair notice, because the allegations in
the answer did not support each element of the defenses. 258 On these
affirmative defenses, the court granted leave to amend. 259 By ruling in such
a manner, the Voeks court allowed itself to continue using its pre-Twombly
standard for determining the sufficiency of affirmative defenses.
III. COURTS SHOULD NOT EXTEND THE TWOMBLY STANDARD TO
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
The previous part examined the major arguments put forward by the
courts in deciding whether to extend the Twombly standard to affirmative
defenses. This part shows that those courts that have decided not to extend
the Twombly standard have plotted the better course. First, it demonstrates
how the language and structure of the Federal Rules do not support an
extension. Next, it shows how the precedents relied upon by those courts
selecting to extend the Twombly standard are insufficient to justify their
decisions. Then, it explains how an extension of the standard will increase
the costs and time associated with litigation. Finally, this part argues that
simple fairness does not warrant an extension of the Twombly standard to
affirmative defenses.
A. The Rules Do Not Follow
The Federal Rules themselves, in both structure and language,
contemplate different treatment of pleadings by claimants and defendants.
Rule 8, governing the general rules for pleadings, explicitly differentiates
between claims for relief and affirmative defenses. 260
The arguments justifying the extension of the Twombly standard to
affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c) based upon the sparse similarity
between the language of Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 8(b)(1) are incoherent. 261
While Rule 8(b)(1) does share the words “short and plain” with Rule
8(a)(2), Rule 8(c) does not contain such language. 262 Even if Rule 8(b)
describes a general pleading standard that also applied to affirmative
defenses under Rule 8(c), that congruence does not implicate Twombly.
The argument that it does ignores the condition in Rule 8(a)(2) that the
“short and plain” statement of the claim must “show[] that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” 263 This “showing” condition in Rule 8(a) is interpreted
in Twombly (and Conley before it) 264 as necessitating that a claim display

258. See id. at *7 (striking the affirmative defenses of laches, waiver, estoppel,
consent/acquiescence, plaintiff’s fault, fault of others, and unclean hands). But see Baum v.
Faith Techs., Inc., No. 10-CV-0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL 2365451, at *3 (N.D. Okla. June
9, 2010) (refusing to strike the equitable defense of unclean hands).
259. See Voeks, 2008 WL 89434, at *7.
260. See supra note 35.
261. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 35.
263. See supra note 35.
264. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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the “grounds” upon which it rests. 265 The language of Rules 8(b) and 8(c)
does not require that a defendant show anything relating to the asserted
defenses, affirmative or otherwise.266 As such, there is no requirement in
the Federal Rules that a defendant must display any grounds upon which its
affirmative defenses rest. Rule 8(c) only requires that a defendant
“affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.”267
The Charleswell court’s well-phrased argument to this effect has not
been countered by any court extending the Twombly standard to affirmative
defenses. 268 Many such courts have been at pains to do so, usually
neglecting to mention Rule 8(c) in their analyses or glossing over the
particularities of Twombly’s language. 269 Moreover, the Federal Rules
require that a defendant plead any affirmative defense that it has.270 The
penalty for failure to so plead is the risk of losing any affirmative defenses
not pled. 271 It is procedurally unjust to penalize defendants for asserting
affirmative defenses in the manner required by the Federal Rules, but this is
what an extension of the Twombly standard entails.
Such stretched readings of the Federal Rules are, if nothing else,
unnecessary. The Rules already give recourse to plaintiffs to defend
themselves against poorly supported affirmative defenses.272 Even if the
threat of sanctions under Rule 11 is not sufficient to defend against terse
and ambiguous defenses, the Federal Rules also supply a more tailored
remedy to the problem: Rule 12(e) motions for a more definite
statement. 273 These rules are more appropriate remedies for insufficient
pleading of affirmative defenses than an extension of the Twombly standard.
Moreover, the Federal Rules are statutory and have a defined amendment
process. 274 Despite perceived expediencies of different rules, it is not
within the authority of the district courts to change the scope or meaning of
the Rules. An application of the Rules that contravenes or obfuscates their
plain meaning violates both the purpose of the Rules and the function of
their most significant recent amendments.275 This application treads
closely toward violating the Rules Enabling Act.276

265. See supra text accompanying notes 68–71.
266. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 35.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 230–32.
269. See supra notes 197–206 and accompanying text.
270. See FED R. CIV. P. 8(c) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state
any avoidance or affirmative defense . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (“Every defense to a
claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is
required.”).
271. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 94, 233–35 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 29–30, 91 and accompanying text.
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B. Extending the Twombly Standard to Affirmative Defenses Is
Unprecedented (Even in Twombly)
The Supreme Court conspicuously couched Twombly and Iqbal in the
structure and language of Rule 8(a). 277 In fact, there is no precedent
requiring the district courts to extend the Twombly standard to affirmative
defenses under Rule 8(c). 278 The precedents relied upon by those courts
that extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses are weak at best,
and even tend to allow for succinctly pleaded affirmative defenses to stand.
Twombly itself did not fully overrule Conley, but rather only Conley’s
“no set of facts” language. 279 The remainder of Conley remains good
law. 280 Conley emphasized the primacy of the Federal Rules and the other
procedural tools available to the courts to “disclose more precisely the basis
of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts
and issues.” 281 Similarly, the frequently cited Woodfield precedent plainly
allows for the mere naming of an affirmative defense. 282 A succinctly
phrased affirmative defense should survive either of these standards.
However, this has not prevented the careful parsing of precedent by courts
to extend the Twombly standard. 283
The action within the district courts presents a very real danger of
snowballing, wherein a court notices a majority position on the issue and is
influenced to rule on the same side.284 Because the policy arguments
espoused by courts extending the Twombly standard are indicative of
exhaustion and a heavy workload, courts should reconsider the value of
persuasive precedent that evinces a court’s own frustrations.285 The easy
way out is not necessarily the right way, and the courts should not sacrifice
the interests of justice on account of their own docket loads.

277. See supra notes 68–74, 118–27 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 25, 249 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
281. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957); see also supra notes 47–49 and
accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 165–67, 198 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 207–16 and accompanying text. Seven decisions referenced in this
Note that extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses cite as persuasive the
decision in Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. O’Hara Corp., No. 08-CV-10545, 2008 WL
2558015 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008), which is written by an obviously frustrated judge. See
Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228, 233 n.1 (E.D.N.C. 2010); Francisco v.
Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77083, at *17 n.3 (E.D. Va. July 29,
2010); HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 2010);
Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650 n.15 (D. Kan. 2009); Burget v. Capital
W. Sec., Inc., No. CIV-09-1015-M, 2009 WL 4807619, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 8, 2009);
Shinew v. Wszola, No. 08-14256, 2009 WL 1076279, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2009);
Fogel v. Linnemann (In re Mission Bay Ski & Bike, Inc.), No. 07 B 20870, No. 08 A 55,
2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2495, at *16 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2009).
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C. Strike, Amend, Repeat
It is unclear, however, that the courts’ dockets would be cleared by an
extension of the Twombly standard. While the standard may offer some
efficiencies relating to discovery, it would also burden all parties and the
court with dramatic increases in costly and time-consuming motion
practice. 286 While the expense of litigation may have been a motivating
factor in establishing the Twombly standard for claims, perhaps counterintuitively, it weighs against extending that standard to affirmative
defenses. 287
First, Rule 12(f) motions to strike will arise more frequently because
courts will be perceived as more receptive to them. 288 However, striking
affirmative defenses is still a drastic remedy, even after Twombly. 289 If
motions to strike continue to be granted more liberally after the Twombly
standard has been extended to affirmative defenses, then every policy
consideration against motions to strike weighs equally against an
extension. 290 Moreover, when motions to strike are successful, the liberal
policy of amendment for deficient affirmative defenses paves the way for
even further cost and delay. 291
In most cases, the colorable defenses of cost-conscious defendants will
surface, and those that are not will either be discarded or will be summarily
handled at trial. 292 Courts should remember in the first instance that the
burden of proof remains with the defendant to support his affirmative
defenses; there is no threat that justice will be hindered by the inclusion of
more affirmative defenses.293
As a near-aside, the policy of liberally granting leave to amend is
insufficient to protect defendants from the harshness of an extension of the

286. See supra notes 246–48 and accompanying text; see also Barnes v. AT&T Pension
Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1175–76 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“On
a final note, the court reminds the parties that the court’s time is valuable and motions to
strike are disfavored. While it appears that the defendant made an attempt to resolve this
dispute by proposing to stipulate to an amended answer, the court is disappointed that the
parties were unable to come to an agreement. It is the court’s opinion that while plaintiff
partially succeeded on the merits of his motion, the issues raised would not have been
difficult to address solely between the parties. The parties should be reminded that the filing
of a second motion to strike would be extraordinary and the parties might be well served by
rereading Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 before making such a motion.”); Baum v. Faith
Techs., Inc., No. 10-CV-0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL 2365451, at *4 n.9 (N.D. Okla. June 9,
2010) (“The utter lack of meaningful prejudice leaves the Court with the distinct impression
that the parties need to step back and take a deep breath before filing motions. The parties
are encouraged to attempt to resolve their technical disputes between themselves, and are
advised that sharp litigation practices are disfavored. The parties are also advised that the
mischaracterization of authority is not helpful.”); Miller, supra note 31, at 61–71.
287. See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 189, 217–22 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
293. See supra text accompanying note 37.
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Twombly standard. 294 Those motions are frequently contested. 295 Some
facts in support of affirmative defenses may only come out during
discovery, and the scope of discovery is limited to the pleadings.296 The
defendant may not be allowed to discover the facts necessary to assert
defenses it would otherwise have pled and runs the risk of waiving those
defenses. 297 Finally, motions to amend are sometimes denied and a
defendant is left to suffer the consequences.298
D. What Is Good for the Goose Is Not Always Good for the Gander
Procedure, precedent, and policy have all discouraged the extension of
the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses. Simple fairness does as well.
First, it should be noted that the general criticisms of the Twombly
standard as it applies to claims are equally applicable to its extension to
affirmative defenses. 299 While some commentators argue the necessity of
extending the standard for fairness’ sake, 300 simply put, two wrongs will
not make a right. One cannot remedy any inequalities imposed upon
federal pleading by Twombly by extending its standard even further.
A defendant is at a gratuitous disadvantage in the acquisition of factual
material at the pleading stage. 301 A blanket standard that does not account
for this discrepancy shocks the conscience. Shocking, too, is the
inconsistency with which the district courts apply the standard, even where
it has been extended. 302 A defendant is left to guess whether a court will
apply the standard at all and, if so, the standard’s parameters. The federal
pleading standard for defenses ought not to formalize such inequalities;
where large sums of money and reputations may be on the line, defendants
should be accorded every opportunity to defend themselves. In all such
considerations, the courts should remember the imperative of Rule 8(e):
“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.” 303
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court reinvented the federal pleading standard for claims in
Twombly by abrogating Conley’s “no set of facts” language, which had
determined the sufficiency of a pleaded claim for fifty years. Because of
Twombly’s scale, it is not surprising that there have been disagreements as
to its scope. Many district courts have found that Twombly extends beyond
the bounds of what a simple reading of its text would suggest and have
applied its reasoning and conclusion to the pleading of affirmative defenses.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

See supra notes 217–22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 7, 247–48, 250 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 155, 187–88, 220 and accompanying text.
See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20, 220 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 154, 157, 248 and accompanying text.
See supra note 194.
See supra notes 240–43 and accompanying text.
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
See supra note 35.
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Such a tack is far from universal, however, as many other district courts
have found that the standard for pleading claims articulated in Twombly is
inapplicable to affirmative defenses. The resolution of this conflict has the
potential to impact every affirmative defense asserted in a federal court.
Both sides of the issue rely heavily on the Federal Rules, preferred
practice, and notions of fairness in coming to their conclusions. However,
as this Note has shown, procedure, precedent, and policy heavily support
not extending the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses. This
conclusion assures that district courts will not disregard the text and
intentions of the Federal Rules. Moreover, this conclusion hews closer to
Twombly itself. It does this first by respecting the language of Twombly
and the other precedents with which it interacts. Second, it adheres more
closely to the overt public policy consideration of Twombly by pursuing
judicial efficiency and avoiding several rounds of unnecessary motion
practice. Abandoning the Federal Rules, precedent, and judicial efficiency
by extending the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses would cause
great injustice to the involuntary parties to federal actions, as defendants
would be disallowed the benefits of a full and vigorous defense.

